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Psychology

Naming and
Knowing: Giving
Forms to Things
Unknown

/

BY

LJ NLESS we believe that we can create a distinct name for
every conceivable object, thought, feeling, and action—and
persuade everyone else to use the same set of names—we
might as well concede from the start that we are necessarily
creatures of metaphor. For time and time again, we are forced to
construct and convey our understanding of things through the
use of terms previously reserved for other things, on the basis
of some perceived or conjectured similarity between them.
And even if we refuse to accept that this sort of cross-naming
and knowing-by-comparison is inevitable, we can hardly deny
that metaphor does in fact account for a large portion of what
we know and think, not to mention what we feel, communicate, and do.
Metaphor, in other words, is no mere grammatical or
rhetorical device. It is one of the major means by vuhich we
steer our way through life, gaining as much traction as we can
on a roadbed of partial similarities. Common experiences—
and experiences of commonality—allow us to construct
concepts and words that can be used again and again in a wide
variety of situations. This potential for multiple reference
accounts for the power of metaphor—the power of comparing,
comprehending, and communicating; the power of putting
our finite resources to virtually infinite use.
I have written about this elsewhere, focusing in particular
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Summer 1995)
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upon the role of metaphor in the realm of psychology (Leary,
1990), but many others have reached the same basic insights.
Aristotle, for instance, recognized that giving names to
previously nameless things is our best means of "getting hold
of something fresh," and he argued accordingly that "the
greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor" (Aristotle,
ca. 330 B.C./1952a, p. 662; ca. 330 B.C./1952b, p. 694). In
more recent times, Isaiah Berlin is but one of many scholars
and thinkers who have noted the impossibility of doing without
metaphor:
To think is to generalise, to generalise is to compare. To think of
one phenomenon or cluster of phenomena is to think in terms
of its resemblances and differences with others. This is by now a
hoary platitude. It follows that without parallels and analogies
between one sphere and another of thought and action, whether
conscious or not, the unity of our experience—our experience
itself—would not be possible. All language and thought are, in
this sense, necessarily 'metaphorical' (1981, p. 158).
This is as true in the realm of science as in everyday
experience. To understand any phenomenon, scientists need
to compare it with an established point of reference or some
other standard. At some earlier time, that reference or
standard, in turn, was established in relation to some other
object. And so on, and so on.
This might sound neater than it should. There is nothing
simple and ineluctable about the ways in which our knowledge,
feelings, and actions are constructed, whether in science or in
any other domain. The delicious complexity of how it can be
done is more than half the challenge and fun of how it actually
is done. Ultimately, the process depends upon what our bodies
sense and our minds imagine. Our modern ambivalence about
both sensibility (especially "feelings") and cognition (especially
"imagination") is well known. Science has tried to legislate this
ambivalence out of existence by dictating the acceptable forms
of sensibility and by limiting the free play of the imagination.
Until the recent downfall of simple-minded positivism, such
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dictation obscured the actual workings of sensibility and
imagination in the realm of science. Ironically, this led to a
situation in which the concept of the imagination was "seldom
encountered in modern treatments of analogy in science"
(Park, Daston, and Galison, 1984, p. 287). However, this
situation has been changing as serious refiection upon the roles
of "fact, fiction, and forecast" (Goodman, 1954), "personal
knowledge" (Polanyi, 1958), "plans" (Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram, 1960), "foresight and understanding" (Toulmin,
1961), "the logic of scientific discovery" (Hanson, 1961),
"conjectures and refutations" (Popper, 1963), "posits and
reality" (Quine, 1966), "paradigms" (Kuhn, 1970), "the
thematic imagination in science" (Holton, 1973), "ways of
worldmaking" (Goodman, 1978), "the construction of reality"
(Arbib and Hesse, 1986), "science as creative perceptioncommunication" (Bohm and Peat, 1987), "constructive realism" (Giere, 1988), and "imagistic and analogical reasoning"
(Nersessian, 1990) have come to the fore. There is a clear and
emerging realization these days that the scientist, too, has an
imagination that "bodies forth the forms of things unknown"
and gives to them "a local habitation and a name"
(Shakespeare, 1598/1936, p. 406). This is to say that the
scientist, too, is a "maker." Indeed, the modern scientist has
demonstrated the awesome truth of Ralph Waldo Emerson's
conviction that "the v^^hole of nature is a metaphor of the
human mind" (1836/1983, p. 24) and Wallace Steven's
contention that "the imagination is man's power over nature"
(1930-1955/1982, p. 179). These claims assume, of course, that
the imagination is stimulated by and nurtured through its
embeddedness in nature.
The purpose of this essay is to provide some "forms" and
"habitations"—some principles and examples, if you will—of
the phenomenon of metaphorical thinking in science. First, I
will share some general comments about this phenomenon,
and then I will illustrate it v^ith an extended discussion of a
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recent line of thought, research, and application within
behavioral psychology.

Naming

Whenever we are confronted with something that we do not
know, we search about for a concept or label—a name—by
which we might know it. A simple example would be a word
that we do not know: We might ask someone else what it
means, or we might look it up in a dictionary. In either case, we
will keep asking and searching until the word is defined in
terms of other words that are better known to us.
This simple example can serve as a paradigm for the various
ways in which we come to understand "reality." Whenever any
aspect of our experience calls for understanding, we begin to
look about for what William James called "similar instances"
(1890, chaps. 13, 19, and 22). Only when we have found an apt
"peg" or "pigeonhole" for this aspect of our experience do we
feel the subjective satisfaction that brings our search to an end.
The similar instances that, thus, come to serve as our pegs and
pigeonholes—as our categories of understanding—are either
explicitly or implicitly metaphorical in nature and function.
They provide the means by which we manage to place and to
label our experiences of things, thus giving them "a local
habitation and a name."
In reflecting upon the many variations of this process, it
becomes obvious that all knowledge is ultimately rooted in
metaphorical (or analogical) modes of perception and thought.' By

extension, metaphor necessarily plays a fundamental role in
every domain of knowledge, including the domain of science.
Although this is a very large claim, it has the backing of
theorists of markedly different persuasions, including empiricists and pragmatists as well as idealists and intellectual
anarchists. The commonality of this view across such a wide
spectrum of thinkers has rarely been noted, much less
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appreciated, perhaps because of the differences in the
vocabularies favored by theorists of such varied and even
contradictory orientations. Without an appropriate metaterminology based upon a sufficiently broad meta-theory, the
cacophony of their individual voices has made it difficult to
hear the persistent theme that underlies their disparate
articulations. Still, if we listen carefully and allow for variations
in orientation and terminology, we can gather such pertinent
and coherent statements as: David Hume: "All arguments
from experience are founded on the similarity which we
discover among natural objects" (1748/1972, p. 36). Immanuel
Kant: "We are justified in combining appearances [in order to
arrive at concepts] only according to what is no more than an
analogy" (1781/1965, p. 88). Jeremy Bentham: "In the use
made of language, fiction. . .becomes a necessary resource"
(1841/1962, p. 331). Alexander Bain: "Some discoveries turn
upon this [use of the law of similarity] exclusively; and
no succession of discoveries can proceed without it" (1855, p.
508). Friedrich Nietzsche: "The drive toward the formation of
metaphors is the fundamental human drive"( 1873/1979, p.
88). William James: "A native talent for perceiving analogies
is. . .the leading fact in genius of every order" (1890, vol. 1, p. 530).

Charles Peirce: "Upon finding himself confronted with a
phenomenon unlike what he would have expected. . . , [the
reasoner] looks over its features and notices some remarkable
character or relation among them, which he at once recognizes
as being characteristic of some conception with which his mind
is already stored. . . . Presumption [the 'abducting' of
similarities] is the only kind of reasoning which supplies new
ideas" (ca. 1893/1932, p. 777). Hans Vaihinger: "All cognition
is the apperception of one thing through another. In
understanding, we are always dealing with an analogy, and we
cannot imagine how otherwise experience can be understood.
. . .All conception and cognition are based upon analogical
apperception" (1911/1924, p. 29). Ernst Cassirer: "Myth and
language [which he considered to be the roots of human
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cognition] may differ, yet the same form of mental conception
is operative in both. It is the form which we may denote as
metaphorical thinking" (1925/1946, p. 84).
We can find the same kinds of statements by those who study
the nature and history of language: Max Miiller, the great
comparative linguist, noted that "no advance was possible in
the intellectual life of man without metaphor" (1876, p. 370).
Fritz Mauthner, the writer and philosopher, averred that
"without exception every word in its individual usage is
metaphorical" and that "we have learnt to understand
metaphor as the term for the phenomenon which others call
the growth or the development of language" (quoted in
Gerschenkron, 1974, p. 432). And I.A. Richards argued that
"metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language" (1936),
and later stated that it is also the fundamental principle of
thinking:
Thinking is radically metaphoric. Linkage by analogy is its
constituent law or principle, its causal nexus, since meaning only
arises through the causal contexts by which a sign stands for
(takes the place of) an instance of a sort. To think of anything is
to take it as of a sort (as a such and such) and that 'as' brings in
(openly or in disguise) the analogy, the parallel, the metaphoric
grapple or ground or gasp or draw by which alone the mind
takes hold. It takes no hold if there is nothing for it to haul
from, for its thinking is the haul, the attraction of likes
(Richards, 1938, pp. 48-49).
Many recent philosophers of science have built upon such
insights. The works of Max Black (1962) and Mary Hesse
(1966) are particularly relevant,^ both for their own sake and
because they presage Thomas Kuhn's recent assignment of
metaphor to a preeminent role in the process of revolutionary
change in science. As Kuhn (1987) has put it, of the three
characteristics shared by the major scientific revolutions that
he has studied at length, the one that "has been the most
difficult. . .for me to see, but now seems the most obvious and
probably the most consequential," is the common occurrence
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of a "central change of model, metaphor, or analogy—a
change in one's sense of what is similar to what, and of what is
different" (1987, p. 20). The crux of Kuhn's analysis is that the
groupings or categorizations of phenomena change radically
and holistically in the course of a scientific revolution, so that
what once were "natural categories" of perception and
understanding no longer are such. Aristotle, as he points out,
found it quite natural to assume that "the falling stone was like
the growing oak, or like the person recovering from illness,"
and, thus, that all three were instances of "motion" (Kuhn,
1987, p. 20). Newton's alignment of like and unlike, however,
was completely different. After reviewing this and other
instances of scientific change, Kuhn further noted that,
all these cases display interrelated features familiar to students
of metaphor. In each case two objects or situations are
juxtaposed and said to be the same or similar. . . .The
juxtaposed items are exhibited to a previously uninitiated
audience by someone who can already recognize their similarity,
and who urges that audience to learn to do the same. . . .Thus,
the education of an Aristotelian associates the flight of an arrow
with a falling stone and both with the growth of an oak and the
return to health. . . .The student [thus] learns what categories of
things populate the world, what their salient features are, and
something about the behavior that is and is not permitted to
them. In much of language learning these two sorts of
knowledge—knowledge of words and knowledge of nature—are
acquired together, not really two sorts of knowledge at all, but
two faces of the single coinage that a language provides (Kuhn,
1987, pp. 20-21).

Kuhn's relevant conclusion is simply that "the metaphor-like
juxtapositions that change at times of scientific revolution are
thus central to the processes by which scientific and other
language is acquired" (Kuhn, 1987, p. 21).
Of course, with the passage of time, some changes in
perception and thought become so typical and familiar that
terms and statements that were once obviously "metaphorical"
come to be considered "literal." As one scholar of metaphor
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has put it, even "metaphors that were false seem to become
true, and metaphors that were ungrammatical seem to become
grammatical, both through usage" (MacCormac, 1985, p. 27).
This historical observation suggests what others have argued,
namely, that there is no radical distinction between the
metaphorical and the literal, as indeed there cannot be if all
language is ultimately metaphorical (see Arbib and Hesse,
1986, p. 150). It is not surprising, then, that neither
grammarians nor semanticists have been able to provide a
definitive demarcation between "the metaphorical" and "the
literal." We must rely instead upon pragmatic distinctions
based on conventional usage: To the extent that the use of a
term is novel or unusual, it is likely to be considered
"metaphorical"; to the extent that it is typical and taken for
granted, it is likely to be considered "literal."
This issue of literality is important to us because science has
so often been presented as being completely "objective" and as
utilizing a pristinely "neutral" language. Yet even during the
heyday of positivist philosophy of science, there were
critics—often literary critics—who saw that matters stood
somewhat differently. For instance, Kenneth Burke wrote:
As the documents of science pile up, are we not coming to see
that whole works of scientific research, even entire schools, are
hardly more than the patient repetition, in all its manifestations,
of a fertile metaphor? Thus we have, at different eras in history,
considered man as the son of God, as an animal, as a political or
economic brick, as a machine, each such metaphor, and a
hundred others, serving as the cue for an unending line of data
and generalization (1935/1965, p. 95).
And M.H. Abrams wrote:
Metaphor, whether alive or moribund, is an inseparable element
of all discourse, including discourse whose purpose is neither
persuasive nor aesthetic, but descriptive and informative.
Metaphysical systems in particular are intrinsically metaphorical
systems. . . .Even the traditional language of the natural sciences
cannot claim to be totally literal, although its key terms often are
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not recognized to be metaphors until, in the course of time, the
general adoption of a new analogy yields perspective into the
nature of the old. . . . For facts are facta, things made as much as
things found, and made in part by the analogies through which
we look at the world as through a lens (t953, p. 31).
Clearly, Burke's discussion of "fertile metaphors" and Abrams'
analysis of "constitutive analogies" foreshadowed Thomas
Kuhn's more recent work (1970) on "scientific paradigms." But
before them all, the philosopher Stephen Pepper gave a classic
statement about the related notion of "root metaphors":
A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue
to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms
of this one. This original idea becomes then his basic analogy or
root metaphor. He describes as best he can the characteristics of
this area, or, if you will, discriminates its structure. A list of its
structural characteristics becomes his basic concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories. In terms
of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact
whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to
interpret all facts in terms of these categories (1942, p. 91).
Pepper's line of thinking has proven to be prescient and
persuasive and has been carried forward along a variety of
trajectories.
What I am trying to show, with generous but very partial
reference to the words and works of others, is that many
leading scholars have shared the conviction that "metaphor
permeates all discourse, ordinary and special" (Goodman,
1976, p. 80). With regard to science in particular, a similarly
broad array of scholars have begun to study the ways in which
metaphorical thinking has helped to constitute scientific theory
and practice.3 The bottom line is that the overall effect of this
widespread scholarly activity has been to confirm the basic
insight reached by J.Z. Young, after his review of various
metaphors that had been used to understand the functioning
of the brain:
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This whole business of making comparisons may seem to you
absurd and useless. It is, however, one of our chief aids to
exploring the world and hence to getting a living. Indeed, I
hope in later lectures to show that it is a tool we have been using
in essentially the same way for thousands of years. For many
purposes we have no other means of communication. It is not a
question of whether or not to make comparisons but of which
comparisons to make. We must use the rules—the certainties we
have established by past experience. It is by comparison with
these that each of us shapes his future. We must compare things,
because that is the way our brains are constituted (1951, p. 60).

Of course, the "certainties" that we have established,
individually and collectively, are relative rather than absolute;
but as Young has suggested, they are the bases upon which we
continue to bootstrap our understanding of ourselves and the
world around us. Metaphor allows us to get a fingerhold, to
pull ourselves forward, to reach toward what is now beyond
our grasp.
Having provided this context for my general theme, namely,
that the use of metaphorical or comparative thinking is
endemic to the ways in which scientists and non-scientists alike
come to comprehend themselves and their world, I want to
focus in the remainder of this essay upon an extended
illustration of the contention, expressed by W.V.O. Quine, that
metaphor is particularly vital "at the growing edges of science"
(1979, p. 159). Indeed, it is precisely at the edges of our
knowledge that we are most obviously pressed to give forms to
things unknown, and I will be particularly interested in what
follows to show how new "forms" or "names" are given—and
are being given right now—in the ongoing life of what Thomas
Kuhn has called "normal science" (1970). For if a set of
"forms" or "names" occasionally ends up taking over major
portions of a discipline, thus bringing about a large-scale
revolutionary "paradigm change," the more typical transformations in the normal day-to-day life of science take place
more slowly and less dramatically by means of the cumulative
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effects of smaller and sometimes more temporary metaphoric
changes.
Whether or not the example I shall discuss will become part
of a large-scale, more permanent paradigm or remain a
smaller and perhaps more evanescent phenomenon, it
nonetheless warrants attention because it illustrates a number
of things about the power of metaphor in science. First, since
its relevance to the field in which it has developed was initially
counter-intuitive, and since its deducible, subsequently confirmed theoretical and practical consequences were the opposite
of widely accepted truth at the time of its articulation, the
history of this metaphor demonstrates the significant, nontrivial role that metaphors can play in science. In short, they
can make a very substantive difference in the theory and
practice of a discipline. Second, since this metaphor has
evolved within a scientific tradition that has been vociferously
flniiconceptual and, hence, «n^?metaphoric—a tradition that has
eschewed the idea that an idea can make any empirical
difference in the development of science—there is no way that
anyone can claim that the infiuence of this metaphor has been
due to any prejudice in favor 0/metaphorical thinking. Indeed,
the fact that it has made its mark within this particular
tradition underscores the inherent power of metaphor. Third,
the story of this metaphor is not atypical of other ongoing
developments on the edges of scientific fields. It does not
represent Psychology Writ Large, already known to everyone.
Rather, it represents lower-case, restricted-domain psychology,
struggling for attention and existence. Developments on this
scale and at this level illustrate the way in which the power of
metaphor is more typically manifested, not in paradigmatic
fioods that overwhelm the topography of a discipline in a
sudden rush for all to see, but in metaphoric drips that change
the landscape much more slowly and less perceptibly. The
repeated and varied uses of the metaphor I shall discuss below
are precisely the kind of "drips" that are now accumulating
into streams which, if sustained, may develop into even larger
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tributaries. If that happens, the wider domain of psychology is
likely to be changed.

Knowing: The Example of Behavioral Momentum

Aristotle was perhaps the first to note that metaphors, to be
effective, should be neither far-fetched nor obvious: If they
are too unusual, they will be unintelligible to most people; if
they are too ordinary, they will simply confirm what is already
commonplace understanding (ca. 330 B.C./1952a, pp. 662663). He also noted that if someone wishes to confer respect
upon a topic, it would be wise for that person to take his or her
metaphors from a domain held in higher esteem than the topic
under consideration (ca. 330 B.C./1952a, p. 655).
These insights have been confirmed and applied over and
over in the history of science. In the history of the social and
behavioral sciences, in particular, this has often meant that
metaphorical comparisons are drawn from the more advanced
and prestigious natural sciences, especially from astronomy,
chemistry, and physics, but also from biology (especially since
Charles Darwin). Not surprisingly, Newtonian science has been
a key source of social and behavioral metaphors, ranging from
Bishop Berkeley's "social gravitation" (1713/1955) and David
Hume's "experimental method of reasoning in moral subjects"
(1739-1740/1978) to Sigmund Freud's "dynamic psychology"
(1923/1961) and Talcott Parsons' "theory of action" (Parsons,
Bales, and Shils, 1953). In fact, it is safe to say that all the talk
and texts about the "statics" and "dynamics" of mental and
social processes, which have received so much attention since
the seventeenth century, have drawn their metaphorical
substance from the general "mechanical worldview" of Newton
and his contemporaries (see Dijksterhuis, 1969). Although the
Darwinian and Einsteinian worldviews have inspired similarly
plentiful conceptual offshoots over the past century—and
although "chaos theory" is currently generating a host of
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competing metaphors—the Newtonian tradition remains a
powerful source for metaphorical understanding. One particularly interesting instance has been the recent development of
a tradition of research, theory, and practice associated with the
metaphoric concept of "behavioral momentum." This tradition
invites study for a number of reasons, including the fact that it
shows how an already well established tradition, based on one
family of metaphors, can be modified and enhanced by the
translation of its insights and findings into a different
metaphoric language. Further, it shows how this kind of
translation from one language to another can lead to
distinctive implications for clinical and other types of applied
work. In these several ways, a review of this tradition will
illustrate how a basic metaphoric insight can advance a
scientific field, both in theory and practice.
The story begins in the early 1970s within the relatively
small but vital group of psychologists whose research was
advancing the scientific agenda of B.F. Skinner. This agenda,
known as "radical behaviorism," was established some decades
earlier in a series of works (especially Skinner, 1938, and
Ferster and Skinner, 1957) that drew in significant ways upon
the central Darwinian metaphors of variation, selection, and
utility. In brief. Skinner proposed and provided some
demonstrations suggesting that organisms emit spontaneous
variations in behavior, some of which are subsequently selected
(that is, "reinforced") because of their utility. This agenda of
"selection by consequences" (Skinner, 1981) spawned an
experimental tradition that generated a series of "laws of
learning," articulated in quantitative terms, that specified the
relationship between behaviors and their repercussions, conceptualized as "reinforcements" (for example, food) that are
provided according to various kinds of "schedules" (for
example, at regular or varying intervals).
In this tradition, also known as "Skinnerian" or "operant"
behaviorism (for its emphasis on the fact that organisms
operate proactively in their environments, rather than simply
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respond retroactively in a "Pavlovian" or "respondent"
manner), reinforcement is routinely said to "strengthen"
behavior whereas nonreinforcement "weakens" it. However,
even before the 1970s, it was clear that "response strength" was
a problematic notion which ought not be used, since two of its
presumed measures (the rate of response and resistance to
extinction) were often uncorrelated. That is, when reinforcement was suspended, different things happened to the speed
and the persistence of previously reinforced behavioral
responses. This well known but nonetheless neglected anomaly
gave rise to a series of experiments by a member of this
research tradition, John A. (Tony) Nevin, the first of which
was published in 1974.4 In these studies, it became apparent
that while the rate of responding could be described and
explained in terms of the traditional operant language of
"reinforcement," consonant with the general Darwinian notion
of "selection by consequences," the factors involved in
resistance to change (or persistence of response) when
reinforcement is reduced or eliminated bore further attention.
Five years later, Nevin published a searching and capacious
chapter that reviewed the literature and provided additional
experimental results on the relationship between reinforcement schedules and response strength. His primary concern
was to correct the long-standing bias in the field, according to
which "schedule research" focused almost exclusively on "the
rates and patterns of responding maintained under constant
conditions" (1979, p. 117). His objective, following up on his
previous article, was to see if and how resistance to change was
affected by altering conditions (that is, altering schedules of
reinforcement) rather than holding them constant. In the
simplest case, he wondered if and how long an organism would
continue responding as it had learned to do when all
reinforcement was withdrawn. Would the organism resist
changing the behavior it had learned, or would it stop
behaving as it had learned to do? This was a crucial question in
his attempt to clarify the issues and factors that seemed to be at
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stake. By the end of his intricate analysis, he was able to
conclude that resistance to change seems to be a very
fundamental and distinctive aspect of learned behavior.
Indeed, contrary to mainstream work in the operant tradition,
he showed that response strength is a concept that should be
brought back out of the behaviorist's closet and be measured
not primarily by response rate under stable conditions (the
focal concern in most published research in this tradition) but
by persistence in response rate when conditions are altered.
As Nevin later admitted, even the old "response strength"
language that he was still using (first popularized by
Thorndike, 1911) was implicitly metaphorical, since in
everyday terms "to reinforce means to make more resistant to
attack, by weather or an armed opponent" (personal communication, 17 May 1994); but he was soon to propose a more
obvious and specifically Newtonian metaphor, which would
provide the framework within which he was able to translate
these old metaphors of reinforcement and resistance into a
new theoretical language.
His proposal was expressed in the title of an article in 1983,
"The Analysis of Behavioral Momentum," which he published
with two research associates. (He had, in the meantime,
published another relevant article with Mandell and Yarensky
in 1981.) He began this article with a summary of his central
thesis:
Learned behavior varies in its resistance to change, depending
on the rate of reinforcement. Resistance to change may be
characterized as behavioral momentum, which in turn may be
analyzed into terms corresponding to mass and velocity in
classical physics. Behavioral mass may be inferred from changes
in response rate when experimental conditions are altered
(Nevin, Mandell, and Atak, 1983, p. 49).
Leaving no doubt about it, he and his co-authors started their
explication with a quotation of Newton's first law, and went on
to admit that "by analogy" they were suggesting that
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"performance exhibiting greater resistance to change [should]
be construed as having greater mass" (1983, p. 50). In this and
in a series of subsequent publications, Nevin and his associates
worked out and tested the implications of his new family of
metaphors, in which "behavioral momentum," "velocity," and
"mass" took the place of "response strength," "response rate,"
and "resistance to change," respectively.^ Interestingly, he
sometimes submerged his metaphorical language (in Nevin,
Smith, and Roberts, 1987, and Nevin, Tota, Torquato, and
Shull, 1990), perhaps in response to resistance to change
within the operant community; but over all, there was a
remarkable, progressive unfolding of his new theoretical
language as well as a similarly impressive sharpening of his use
of it, leading up to "An Integrated Model for the Study of
Behavioral Momentum" (1992b).
Although it will telescope the historical development of this
"Newtonian" theory, it might be useful to provide a synopsis of
"the metaphor of behavioural momentum," as published by
Nevin in a British journal, to demonstrate that this metaphor is
anything but a whimsical, purely suggestive analogy:
The fact that reinforcement increases response rate rapidly,
whereas nonreinforcement decreases response rate slowly,
suggests that reinforcement endows behaviour with something
analogous to the momentum of a physical body. For example, a
ball may be set in motion by a single kick, after which it slows
gradually. . . .^
In classical mechanics, momentum is defined as the product of
the velocity and mass of a moving body. Newton's first law states
that a body in motion continues to move in the same direction at
a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force.
Likewise, responding . . . under maintained conditions of
reinforcement continues at a constant rate until some external
variable operates to change it. Newton's second law of motion
states that the change in motion is directly related to the
magnitude of the external force, and inversely related to the
mass of the body. Likewise, the change in response rate is
directly related to the magnitude of the external variable, and
inversely related to the rate of reinforcement that maintained
responding before the external variable was applied. Thus, by
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analogy, behaviour may be construed as having a mass-like
dimension that is directly related to the rate of reinforcement
maintaining it.
In the momentum metaphor, velocity and mass are independent dimensions of a moving body. Likewise, response rate and
resistance to change are both conceptually and empirically
independent aspects of operant behaviour, being determined by
separate processes that are normally confounded. . . .
Together with the results of earlier research. . . , these
findings suggest several conclusions: (a) When conditions are
altered, resistance to change (mass) is independent of response
rate (velocity) established during baseline training; (b) response
rate depends on the response-reinforcer relation during
baseline training; and (c) the resistance to change of that
response rate depends on the stimulus-reinforcer relation
during baseline training (1993a, pp. 163—164).
The formal language about "response-reinforcer relation"
and "stimulus-reinforcer relation" in the conclusion of this
long quotation points out one of the unexpected developments
within this line of research, namely, that one of the measures
of behavioral momentum depends upon operant or Skinnerian principles of learning and the other depends upon
so-called "classical" or Pavlovian principles. Specifically, response rate is determined by the association of responses with
reinforcements, and resistance to change is determined by the
association of concurrent and nearly concurrent environmental features with reinforcements. This finding, first reported in
Nevin (1984), represents a significant empirical breakthrough,
and suggests that the momentum metaphor provides a closer
match—that it is more analogous and less dysanalogous—than
one might have expected.
It is natural to wonder what came first: Did Nevin's
metaphoric conjecture help him isolate the Pavlovian dimension of what was previously called "response strength," or did a
preliminary sense of the possibility of non-operant processes
lead him to suggest the momentum-velocity-mass metaphor?
Nevin's own reports are instructive in this regard:
In the late 197O's, I collected a data set that was designed to
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quantify the relationship between resistance to change of
key-pecking rates [response rates in pigeons] and the previously
maintained rate of food presentation [reinforcement]. I played
with the data for two years, casting about for the simplest and
most compelling treatment, and began toying with physical
analogs—the elasticity of a spring, for example. While flipping
through a physics text, I got caught by the section on
momentum of a physical body, figured out a way to superimpose the trajectories of behavior through time (or against
resistance) in a general way, and published the 1983 paper with
Charlotte Mandell and Jean Atak (now Roberts). The idea was to
distinguish two aspects of behavior—response rate under
constant conditions, and the persistence of that response rate
when conditions were changed—by analogy to velocity and
mass.
In 1984, I recognized that some data I had collected for other
reasons suggested that the mass-like aspect of behavior was
essentially Pavlovian: That is, it depended on the relations
between environmental stimuli and reinforcers rather than the
relation between responses and reinforcers. In 1987, Larry
Smith, Jean Roberts, and I replicated Nevin 1984 and showed
that mass was independent of the response-reinforcer contingency, whereas velocity depended on the response-reinforcer
contingency. In 1990, Tota, Torquato, and I did two experiments that made the separation clear. . . .Since then I have been
going around with a new version of two-factor theory: velocity is
Skinnerian, and mass is Pavlovian (personal communication, 17
May 1994).
In response to a further question, Nevin wrote:
Did the momentum metaphor describe something I already
knew about, or did it help to reach the new formulation? The
answer is, both, in a sort of feedback way. In 1983, the idea of
behavioral momentum was descriptive of a set of ordinal or
qualitative relations that I had known about since 1974; but the
quantification of the mass-like term in the 1983 paper with
Mandell and Atak would not have occurred without the
metaphor. Also, since velocity and mass are physically independent, the metaphor suggested that behavioral velocity (response
rate) and mass (resistance to change) might also be independent
and arise from different processes; this led to the analyses and
arguments from 1984 to 1992 suggesting that velocity is
Skinnerian and mass is Pavlovian (personal communication, 3
June 1994).
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The behavior momentum metaphor, then, seems to have
been at least partially constitutive and was probably largely so.
It directed attention and energy toward particular aspects of
the learning and performance process. Of course, it was not
entirely by chance that Nevin came to it: Not everyone, not
even every behavioral psychologist, spends time "fiipping
through a physics textbook." And, indeed, in response to
another inquiry, Nevin replied: "As for the question of
whether a physical-science metaphor has special power: I think
it does for me, because of my background as a mechanical
engineer. For others, it may have an adverse effect" (personal
communication, 3 June 1994). However, even granting a
predisposition toward physical-science metaphors, it should be
noted that the successful articulation and corroboration of this
metaphorically grounded theory did not come about without a
great deal of careful, even painstaking thinking, experimental
design, data gathering, and analysis:
I had always known that it was possible to interpret Herrnstein's
[1970] single-factor quantitative law of effect in a way that would
encompass my resistance-to-change data, which if true would
obviate the velocity-mass distinction. So I derived a sharp test,
ran the experiment, and showed that Herrnstein's approach
predicted the opposite of my data, whereas a Pavlovian
approach predicted them fairly well. . . .After I submitted that
paper [Nevin, 1992a], I saw (while riding a bus at midnight) a
way to quantify and unify the Pavlovian factors that were
responsible for behavioral mass, and published an integrative
model [Nevin, 1992b]. . . .More recent empirical work has been
relatively minor—refinements around the edges, so to speak
(personal communication, 17 May 1994).
The refinements to which Nevin refers are further
experimental housekeeping chores with regard to the details
and nuances of his basic two-factor theory, but beyond this, a
great deal of research has been extending his theory (which is
based on experimental work with animals) to the study of human
learning and applying it in the modification of behavior. This
started with the publication of "Behavioral Momentum in the
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Treatment of Noncompliance" (Mace, Hock, Lalli, West,
Belfiore, Pinter, and Brown, 1988), continued with "The
Momentum of Human Behavior in a Natural Setting" (Mace,
Lalli, Shea, Lalli, West, Roberts, and Nevin, 1990), and is now
a fairly vital "going concern." Nevin himself, besides publishing a number of papers with others, has extended his model of
learned behavior to clinical practice (1993a), performance
management (1993b), and educational technology (1993c) and
has begun considering its applicability to the understanding of
interstate warfare, addiction, and alcoholism. Beyond that,
other research psychologists and many applied psychologists
have been using the behavioral momentum model in their
work. It is now cited fairly frequently in the literature, and
entire sessions are devoted to it at professional conferences.'''
An important thing to point out is that the implications of
behavioral momentum theory are non-trivial. That is, they are
both substantive and different from the implications of prior
operant theory, which has guided behavioral modification
strategies for many years. For example, the theory suggests—
and research corroborates—that while alternative reinforcement will help bring about the institution of desired behaviors
(increasing their "behavioral velocity"), changing the environmental setting will increase their persistence (adding to their
"behavioral mass"). Working on both fronts, thus, will increase
overall "behavioral momentum" (Nevin, 1993a). While still
conjectural, the theory also allows the prediction that in
business and industry, people will persevere despite adversity
in direct proportion to how they were reinforced in particular
work settings in the past (Nevin, 1993b). And in terms of
learning in schools, the theory suggests to Nevin (1993c) not
only that one should distinguish, but also what one can do about
the distinction between the ability to respond in school (a
measure of response rate) and the ability to apply what is
learned outside the classroom (a measure of resistance to
change). The point here is that by clarifying which particular
factors influence each type of learning, the behavioral
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momentum model provides both understanding and means by
which the acquisition and performance of learned behaviors
can be enhanced.
Although it is too soon to be excessively critical about the
fact that behavioral momentum theory does not yet appear in
psychology textbooks, or even textbooks on learning, it is
interesting to note that such books continue to repeat some
of the outdated suppositions based on the simple-minded
and demonstrably incomplete "response strength" concept.
For instance, the famous (or infamous) partial reinforcement
extinction effect, according to which behaviors learned under
partial reinforcement are more resistant to extinction than
behaviors learned under continuous reinforcement, is limited
primarily to rats in discrete-trial runway studies (Nevin,
1988). Still, this "principle" gets repeated in many printed
sources as well as in many classrooms each year, perhaps
because it has been endorsed (that is, reinforced) in many
powerful settings and, hence, is resistant to change. Its
perpetuation is nonetheless reminiscent of the many inaccurate accounts of John B. Watson's case of "Little Albert,"
which Benjamin Harris (1979) has shown to be classic
instances of people (including estimable scholars) remembering and reporting, over and over, what they wished had been
the case. Behavior momentum may be up against a similar
hobbyhorse. In its favor, however, are the kinds of physical
intuitions that have been nurtured in our culture since the
time of Newton. If these can be highlighted by the
proponents of behavioral momentum, without simultaneously
stimulating the Cartesian notion that humans are somehow
exempted from the clockwork universe that Newton portrayed, Nevin's metaphoric insight may some day be taken
for granted as an objective, literal description of the way
things actually are.
Of course, if this happens, the history of science suggests
that, sooner or later, some other metaphor will make things
seem a little less obvious.
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Conclicsion

I began this essay with the claim that we humans are
necessarily creatures of metaphor and extended this claim to
cover science as well as non-science. As suggested by the
scholars to whom I referred, metaphor often serves to give
forms to things unknown by providing "names" by which they
can be identified. The concept of behavioral momentum, as
proposed and developed by Tony Nevin, is a powerful instance
of this phenomenon. It can now take its place, in psychology,
among the metaphors of telecommunications, control systems
engineering, computer science, holography, and parallel
distributed processing that have oriented theory in the
neuropsychology; among the metaphors of feelings, responses,
diseases, forces, and roles that have guided the conceptualization of the emotions; among the metaphors of pawns, agents,
organisms, and machines that have characterized motivational
theory; among the metaphors of hardware and software,
vigilance and defense, access skeletons and signal detection
devices that have reformed the fields of perception and
cognition; and so on (Leary, 1990). All of these metaphors, as
Nevin acknowledged with regard to behavioral momentum,
have served a constitutive and directive function as well as a
rhetorical function. They have not been merely descriptive,
though they have often been accompanied, as has Nevin's
central metaphor, by additional, second-order, descriptive, or
elaborative metaphors.
As regards the rhetorical function of constitutive metaphors,
it is important to remember, as Karin Knorr Cetina has said,
that "the process of research production and reproduction is
more complex than the equation of metaphor and innovation
suggests" (1981, p. 66). In addition to the unpredictable ideas
that occur to idiosyncratic individuals, scientific workplaces are
suffused with inherited traditions, social norms, institutional
structures, practical routines, and the values and constructs of
their surrounding cultures. Any of these can provide
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inspiration for a particular metaphoric insight. Indeed, if a
particular insight is to reverberate throughout a research
community, it must tap into one of these social dimensions of
science. As Emile Durkheim said long ago:
It is not at all true that concepts, even when constructed
according to the rules of science, get their authority uniquely
from their objective value. It is not enough that they be true to
be believed. If they are not in harmony with the other beliefs
and opinions, or, in a word, with the mass of other collective
representations [the concepts taken for granted by most people
in a given time and place], they will be denied; minds will be
closed to them; consequently it will be as though they did not
exist (1912/1965, p. 486).
Behavioral momentum, because it is related to some central
cultural assumptions, does exist presently as a viable concept
within one particular tradition in the scientific community, but
its long-term existence is far from guaranteed. To the extent
that it comes to make a difference, or promises to make a
difference, in some significant practical regards, it will be that
much more likely to persist and prosper. Metaphors shape
insights, and rhetorical factors help to disseminate them, but
practical concerns will largely determine which will find a more
permanent home.
If the purpose of a scientific work is "to persuade the reader
of the vahdity of the thoughts which it presents," as even the
logical empiricist Rudolf Carnap has admitted (1928/1967, p.
xv), the ultimate purpose of the practical application of these
thoughts is the improvement of the human condition. In the
end, giving forms to things unknown may be less important per
se than the priorities by which we select the things that ought to
be given "a local habitation and a name."
Notes
' See Lanham (1991) for a review of analogy, metonymy, simile,
and synecdoche as but alternative instances of the broader category
of metaphor.
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2 See also Black (1979) and Arbib and Hesse (1986).
' See, for example, Arbib and Hesse (1986), Barbour (1974), Black
(1962, 1979), Bohm and Peat (1987), Boyd (1979), Farber (1950),
Gerschenkron (1974), Gould (1977a,b, 1983), Hesse (1955, 1966,
1980), Hoffman (1980, 1984), Jones (1982), Kuhn (1979), Leary
(1987, 1988, 1990, 1992), Leatherdale (1974), MacCormac (1976,
1985), Martin and Harr^ (1982), Nisbet (1976), North (1980),
Oppenheimer (1956), and Temkin (1977).
* Tony Nevin received his Ph.D. in psychology from Columbia
University in 1963, taught at Swarthmore College, then returned to
Columbia, where he served as department chairperson. In 1972, he
moved to the University of New Hampshire, where he also served as
department chairperson and where he has been since that time.
Along the way, he has been the editor of the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior and the Executive Director of the

Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. A recent publication of
the American Psychological Association's Division of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior described him as being "among the most
distinguished of behavioral psychologists" who "helped to establish
and popularize the quantitative analysis of operant behavior, and has
done extensive research on behavioral momentum and the mechanisms of learning" (Mulick, 1995). In the spring of this year, he
retired from full time teaching, but he plans to continue to supervise
research, consult, give talks, and write. I thank him for his assistance
in the composition of this essay.
^ The subsequent publications, in chronological order, include
Nevin (1984), Nevin, Smith, and Roberts (1987), Nevin (1988),
Nevin, Tota, Torquato, and ShuU (1990), Mace, Lalli, Shea, Lalli,
West, Roberts, and Nevin (1990), Nevin (1992a,b), Mace, Lalli, Shea,
and Nevin (1992), and Nevin (1993a,b,c).
® As his reference to a ball being kicked suggests, Nevin is
particularly effective in the use of what might be called secondary,
descriptive, or elaborative metaphors—metaphors that are primarily
communicative rather than constitutive, in the sense proposed by
Abrams (1953). In a personal communication, he reported that he
often uses such second-order metaphors for their rhetorical
function:
I think the arguments for the independence of behavioral velocity
and mass are more powerful because they tie in with everyday
physical intuitions as well as the formal apparatus of physical
science. For example, when talking to social- and health-science
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audiences, I introduce the distinction by asking them to imagine
two trucks going at identical speeds on a highway, one of which is
heavily loaded and the other lightly loaded. How do you find out
which is more heavily loaded? You can't tell from current speed
alone, but you can tell by asking the drivers simultaneously to shift
into neutral and coast to a stop—the truck that coasts farther is
heavier (personal communication, 3 June 1994).
Of course, the truck's speed is analogous to response rate, shifting
into neutral is analogous to initiating nonreinforcement, and coasting
farther represents greater resistance to change, or persistence of
response.
^ One delightful application can be found in Mace, Lalli, Shea, and
Nevin's analysis of "Behavioral Momentum in College Basketball"
(1992). Yes, there is something to the popular concept of
"momentum" in sports as well as to the reality and importance of
"teamwork"! Requesting publication lists on "behavioral momentum"
through appropriate electronic data bases will produce a good many
references on such topics as the behavioral momentum of compliance
and non-compliance among preschool children and among those
with behavior disorders, and it will reveal that behavioral momentum
is now considered a topic worthy of doctoral dissertations. Basic
research is also being conducted in the United States by Stephen
Cohen (for example, Cohen, Riley, and Weigle, 1993) and in New
Zealand by Anthony McLean (for example. Harper and McLean,
1992), and the annual meetings of the Association of Behavior
Analysis have featured symposia on the application of behavior
momentum theory for some years now.
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